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Introduction
Few people enjoy being the butt of a joke. Many butts have sued;
some have won. This article explores the sometimes seedy, often sexy
landscape of satire and parody.' It asks the ethical and legal question,
has the law gone too far in denying plaintiffs recovery for satire that
cannot be taken as literally true?
The Penthouse parody of Kimberli Pring's performance at the Miss
America pageant provides the touchstone. She lost her suit. So did Hus-
tler target Jerry Falwell. The Supreme Court wrote its Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc. v. Falwell2 decision in terms of "public figures," thus raising
questions of who is a public figure and whether it really matters in par-
ody cases involving statements that cannot be taken as literally true.
"Public figure" plaintiffs have successfully sued in parody cases involving
appropriation (commercial exploitation) of famous names and like-
nesses;3 but even appropriation attacks have failed in cases where an au-
thor has expressed an opinion on a newsworthy topic. Comparing the
success of Johnny Carson's appropriation suit over a portable toilet
named "Here's Johnny" with the failure of Kimberli Pring's suit, it ap-
pears that courts show more sensitivity to commercial than personal
injury.
The primary error in the Pring opinion is its flawed logic that if a
satire contains statements that cannot be literally true, it cannot be
libelous. This logic fails to appreciate that such satire can in fact damage
reputations by creating a nagging question in the reader's mind-are the
statements really based on facts that merely have been stretched for hu-
morous effect?
1. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a satire is a composition which holds up
"prevailing vices or follies" to ridicule. The term is "less correctly" applied to compositions
that "ridicule a particular person or class of persons, a lampoon." A parody is a composition
in which an author's "characteristic turns of thought and phrase... are imitated in such a way
as to make them appear ridiculous, especially by applying them to ludicrously inappropriate
subjects." The term "parody" also applies to a "burlesque of a musical work." See OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
In short, satires hold up vices or follies to ridicule, while parodies hold up literary, artis-
tic, or musical works to ridicule through imitation. Parodies would thus fall under satire as a
subset.
Some cases involve both satire in its broader sense and parody. For instance, Jerry
Falwell was held up to ridicule (satire) through a ridiculous imitation of a Campari Liqueur ad
(parody) in Hustler magazine. At the bottom of the page appeared the disclaimer, "ad par-
ody." See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988).
2. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
3. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983);
Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447
F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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I
Pring and Falwell
A. Pring in Penthouse: Not an Uplifting Experience
The case of Kimberli Jayne Pring shows how outrageous satire can
be and yet still be legally permissible. In separate lawsuits, the Miss
America Pageant and Kimberli Pring, a former "Miss Wyoming" and
Women's Grand National Baton Twirling Champion,4 sued Penthouse
magazine for libel.5 Penthouse published the story, "Miss Wyoming
Saves the World . . . ," in its August 1979 issue. The subtitle to the
article says, "But She Blew the Contest with Her Talent."6
The story tells of "Charlene," a "Miss Wyoming" who is going to
twirl her baton for the talent portion of the "Miss America" contest:
She is about to go on stage and her thoughts are described. She thinks
of Wyoming and an incident there when she was with a football player
from her school. It describes an act of fellatio whereby she causes him
to levitate. The story returns to the Miss America stage where she
goes on to perform her talent. She there performs a fellatio-like act on
her baton, which stops the orchestra. . . . She did not reach the
finals.... Charlene's thoughts are again described and these are how
she would have answered the questions put to the finalists had she been
one. These thoughts were that she would "save the world" with her
real talent with the "entire Soviet Central Committee to prevent a
Third World War? Marshall Tito? Fidel Castro?" She would be the
ambassador of love and peace. The article then describes an act of
fellatio with her coach at the edge of the stage while the audience was
applauding the new Miss America in center stage. This ... causes the
levitation of her coach .... [T]he television cameras were not on the
new Miss America but "remained" on Charlene and her coach who
was then rising into the air, and the story ends.7
English professor Philip Cioffari, who wrote the story, claimed that
he intended it to be a fictional work in no way resembling any real person
or real event.' Penthouse argued that "the story is a spoof of the contest,
ridicule, an attempt to be humorous, 'black humor,' a complete fantasy
which could not be taken literally." 9
4. Spence, The Sale of the First Amendment, A.B.A. J. , Mar. 1989, at 52, 52 (1989).
5. See Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695 F.2d 438, 439 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1132 (1983); Miss America Pageant v. Penthouse Int'l, 524 F. Supp. 1280, 1281 (D.N.J. 1981).
6. Miss America Pageant, 524 F. Supp. at 1285. This case arose from the same factual
situation as the Pring case. The Miss America Pageant, a public figure plaintiff, lost this libel
case on a summary judgment motion because of its failure to present clear and convincing
evidence of defendant's 'actual malice". Id. at 1287-88. See infra notes 39-74 and accompa-
nying text on "actual malice" and "public figures."
7. Pring, 695 F.2d at 441.
8. Miss America Pageant, 524 F. Supp. at 1281.
9. Pring, 695 F.2d at 439.
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The trial jury awarded Pring 1.5 million dollars in compensatory
damages and $25 million in punitive damages. The trial judge reduced
the punitive award by half, to $12.5 million. 10 Penthouse appealed."
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the jury's view that the
story about a baton-twirling "Miss Wyoming" named Charlene was
about the plaintiff, a baton-twirling Miss Wyoming named Kimberli.
But the court ruled against Kimberli on the grounds that the story could
not reasonably be understood as a statement of fact:
We have impossibility and fantasy within a fanciful story. Also of sig-
nificance is the fact that some of the incidents were described as being
on national television and apparently before the audience at the pag-
eant.... This in itself would seem to provide a sufficient signal that the
story could not be taken literally....
[I]t is simply impossible to believe that a reader would not
have understood that the charged portions were pure fantasy and noth-
ing else. 2
In short, the court said that if a story cannot be taken literally, it
cannot be defamatory.' 3 Pring's attorney wanted the court to apply this
doctrine to public figures, not private individuals, but the court de-
clined. I4 The court's reversal of the trial court's judgment on the issue of
defamation was not surprising because the law is well-established that to
recover in a defamation suit, a plaintiff must prove a false statement of
fact.'"
While calling the story "a gross, unpleasant, crude, distorted at-
tempt to ridicule the Miss America contest and contestants,"'' 6 the court
decided that the story was protected by the first amendment and "[t]he
magazine... should not have been tried for its moral standards."'" The
court further ruled that "[i]t would serve no useful purpose to treat sepa-
10. 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2409, 2409 (10th Cir. 1982); see 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir.
1982) (official reporter does not include verdict); see also Spence, supra note 4, at 52.
11. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695 F.2d 438, 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1132 (1983).
12. Id. at 441, 443.
13. According to the court in Pring,
The test is not whether the story is or is not characterized as "fiction," "humor," or
anything else in the publication, but whether the charged portions in context could
be reasonably understood as describing actual facts about the plaintiff or actual
events in which she participated. If it could not be so understood, the charged por-
tions could not be taken literally.
Id. at 442.
14. See National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Greenbelt Coop.
Publishing Ass'n v. Bressler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155
Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
15. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
16. Pring, 695 F.2d at 438.
17. Id.
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rately the 'false light' cause of action nor the 'outrageous conduct' doc-
trine sought to be injected into the trial, as the same [flirst [a]mendment
considerations must be applied."'" The Supreme Court denied certio-
rari. 9 In short, Pring met with no success.
B. Falwell: From the Outhouse to the Courthouse
The United States Supreme Court faced the same issues in the case
of Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.2o Hustler magazine ran a parody
advertisement which looked like a Campari Liqueur ad. Campari had
been running ads with celebrities talking about their "first time" (double
entendre intended) drinking the liqueur. In the parody ad, Reverend
Jerry Falwell talked about his "first time" with his mother in an out-
house. Both were supposedly drunk at the time.2' At the bottom of the
page, in fine print, appeared the disclaimer: "[A]d parody-not to be
taken seriously." 22
Falwell sued Hustler and its publisher, Larry Flynt, for libel, inva-
sion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.23 During
a pretrial deposition, an attorney for Falwell asked Hustler publisher
Flynt if he was trying to damage Jerry Falwell's reputation for integrity.
Flynt answered that he was trying to "assassinate" Falwell's
reputation.24
At the close of evidence in the trial, the judge dismissed Falwell's
invasion of privacy claim. That claim stated Falwell had been damaged
by the unauthorized use of his name or likeness for purposes of trade.
18. Id. at 442.
19. 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
20. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). See R. SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL V. LARRY FLYNT (1988);
Recent Developments, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1146 (1988); Note, Falwell v. Flynt: First Amend-
ment Protection of Satirical Speech, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 313 (1987) (discussing intentional
infliction of emotional distress and criticizing the Fourth Circuit for upholding Falwell's dam-
age award).
21. The text of the advertisement follows:
JERRY FALWELL TALKS ABOUT HIS FIRST TIME
Falwell My first time was in an outhouse in Lynchburg, Virginia.
Interviewer: Wasn't it a little cramped?
Falwell: Not after I kicked the goat out.
Interviewer: I see. You must tell me all about it.
Falwell: I never really expected to make it with Mom, but then after she showed
all the other guys in town such a good time, I figured, 'What the hell!'
Interviewer: But your mom? Isn't that a bit odd?
Falwell: I don't think so. Looks don't mean that much to me in a woman.
R. SMOLLA, supra note 20, at 20.
22. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 48.
23. Id. at 47-48.
24. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). The
court opinion quotes excerpts from the deposition:
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The judge ruled that the use of Falwell's name and likeness did not fall
within the statutory meaning of "for purposes of trade."25
The jury ruled against Falwell on libel, finding that the parody could
not "reasonably be understood as describing actual facts.., or events."'26
But the jury did award Falwell $200,000 for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress-$ 100,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in pu-
nitive damages.27
Falwell, the founder of the "Moral Majority," had voluntarily
"thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue" and thus was a public
figure. 28 Despite Falwell's public figure status, the Fourth Circuit upheld
Q. Did you want to upset Reverend Falwell?
A. Yes....
Q. Do you recognize that in having published what you did in this ad, you were
attempting to convey to the people who read it that Reverend Falwell was
just as you characterized him, a liar?
A. He's a glutton.
Q. How about a liar?
A. Yeah. He's a liar, too.
Q. How about a hypocrite?
A. Yeah.
Q. That's what you wanted to convey?
A. Yeah.
Q. And didn't it occur to you that if it wasn't true, you were attacking a man in
his profession?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you appreciate, at the time that you wrote "okay" or approved this
publication, that for Reverend Falwell to function in his livelihood, and in
his commitment and career, he has to have an integrity that people believe
in? Did you not appreciate that?
A. Yeah.
Q. And wasn't one of your objectives to destroy that integrity, or harm it, if you
could?
A. To assassinate it.
797 F.2d at 1273.
While Flynt's attorney attempted to argue that Flynt was "mentally incapable of telling
the truth" when he was deposed, the court rejected this argument, saying that the relevant
question was one of Flynt's credibility, not his competency. Id. at 1277.
25. Id. at 1273. Falwell had attempted to invoke VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-.40 (1984).
26. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48-49 (1988).
27. Id. Judge Wilkinson claims that the tort of emotional distress originated in an Eng-
lish case involving a joke: "The tort began in a case where a woman suffered serious and
permanent injuries after a practical 'joker' told her to get two pillows to fetch her husband
home because he was smashed up in an accident and had two broken legs. Wilkinson v. Down-
town, [1897] 2 Q.B.D. [sic] 57." Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484, 485-86 (4th Cir. 1986) (Wil-
kinson, J., dissenting from en bane denial of rehearing).
28. The "vortex" language comes from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352
(1973). See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
Judge Wilkinson said this of Falwell:
It is true that he does not hold an office or cast a vote. Yet he is as integral a part of
political life as those who do .... The Reverend Falwell is at the forefront of major
policy debates; he enjoys the most intimate access to the highest circles of power; he
[Vol. 13:141
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the damage award for intentional infliction of emotional distress.2 9 Hus-
tler appealed.3°
Falwell's attorney asked the Supreme Court to hold, in effect, that
even in cases involving a parody, the state's interest in protecting public
figures from emotional distress was sufficient to deny first amendment
protection to that speech. The Court refused to do so.31
Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote the Falwell opinion for a
unanimous Court. In a glowing endorsement of free speech, the Supreme
Court made clear its interest in preserving the "free trade of ideas," even
when the speech is patently offensive and is intended to inflict emotional
distress. The Court expressed concern over the chilling effect on political
cartoons if plaintiffs who could not recover for libel were allowed to re-
cover for emotional distress.3 "The appeal of the political cartoon or
caricature is often based on exploration of unfortunate physical traits or
politically embarrassing events-an exploration often calculated to injure
the feelings of the subject of the portrayal." 3 History is on the side of
"caustic" cartoons: "[F]rom the early cartoon portraying George Wash-
ington as an ass 34 down to the present day, graphic depictions and satiri-
possesses a forum for presenting his views and establishing his character; he has
sought and relished the give-and-take of political combat. This category of public
figure, as much as any public official, will draw "the vehement, caustic, and some-
times unpleasantly sharp attacks" that create emotional distress.
Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484, 485 (4th Cir. 1986) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting from en banc
denial of rehearing) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
29. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1277 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
Flynt's attorneys argued that a reasonable jury could not believe that the parody described
actual facts; therefore, the parody was an opinion and was protected by the first amendment.
The court, however, said that it did not need to address whether the parody was opinion
because the issue was whether the parody was "sufficiently outrageous to constitute intentional
infliction of emotional distress." The Fourth Circuit found evidence of "outrageousness" in
the language of the parody itself, and in the fact that Flynt republished the parody after
Falwell filed his lawsuit. Id. at 1275-76.
The Court of Appeals denied Flynt's request for a rehearing. Falwell, 805 F.2d at 484.
Judge Wilkinson dissented, arguing that "one simply cannot subject a parody of a political
figure to a cause of action for emotional distress. The reason for this is obvious. Political
satire and parody aim to distress. This genre of commentary depends upon distortion and
discomfiture for its effect." Id. at 486-87 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting from en banc denial of
rehearing) (emphasis in original).
30. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 47.
31. Id. at 50.
32. Id. at 52.
33. Id. at 54.
34. In 1789, a cartoonist depicted President George Washington's aide David Humphreys
leading a donkey that carried George Washington. The caption read, "The glorious time has
come to pass/When David shall conduct an ass." Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484, 487 (4th Cir.
1986) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting from en banc denial of rehearing) (citing S. HESS & M.
KAPLAN, THE UNGENTLEMANLY ART: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL CARTOONS 61
(1968)).
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cal cartoons have played a prominent role in public and political
debate." ,35
Falwell's attorney argued that the parody ad should be distin-
guished from the more traditional political cartoons because the ad was
so "outrageous." 36 But the Court held that using "outrageousness" as a
standard in the area of political and social speech is simply too subjec-
tive. It would allow juries to impose liability based on their tastes or
dislikes. 7
The bottom line for the Supreme Court is this:
[P ]ublic figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress... without showing in addi-
tion that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was
made with "actual malice."... [S]uch a standard is necessary to give
adequate "breathing space" to the freedoms protected by the [flirst
[a]mendment.3 8
II
Public Figures and Private Persons
A. A "Thrust" into the "Vortex": Who Is a Public Figure?
The Supreme Court has clearly signaled that public figures who be-
come the target of a joke will have particular trouble recovering. This
raises the question: Who is a public figure?
In 1964, the Supreme Court in the landmark case, New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 39 ruled that public officials in libel cases would have to
35. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Fawell, 485 U.S. 46, 54 (1988). Parody as a method to
comment on society dates back to ancient Greeks. "Chaucer, Shakespeare, Pope, Voltaire,
Fielding, Hemingway and Faulkner are among the myriad of authors who have written paro-
dies. Since parody seeks to ridicule sacred verities and prevailing mores, it inevitably offends
others, as evinced by the shock which Chaucer's Canterbury Tales and Voltaire's Candide
provoked among their contemporaries." L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d
26, 28 (1st Cir. 1987).
Political cartoons, however, have occasionally led to liability when they contain defama-
tory content. See, e.g., Newby v. Times-Mirror Co., 173 Cal. 387, 160 P. 233 (1916) (political
cartoon implying felonious changing of public records); Morley v. Post Printing & Publishing
Co., 84 Colo. 41, 268 P. 540 (1928) (political cartoon charging governor with granting pardons
for bribes). See generally Annotation, Libel and Slander: Defamation by Cartoon, 52
A.L.R.4TH 424 (1987 & Supp. 1989); Annotation, Libel or Slander: Defamation by Statement
Made in Jest, 57 A.L.R.4TH 520 (1987 & Supp. 1989). Accusations of crime historically have
been considered defamatory. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 571 (1977); infra note
160 and accompanying text. Also, historically, slander per se (Le., slander without proof of
"special harm") was imputed from accusations of contracting a "loathsome disease," con-
ducting a "matter incompatible with ... business, trade, profession, or office," or exhibiting
"serious sexual misconduct." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 570, 572-574.
36. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50.
37. Id. at 55.
38. Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
39. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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prove "actual malice" on the part of defendants.' Under this "actual
malice" standard, the plaintiff must prove the defendant's knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for a statement's truth or falsity.4 ' Three
years later, the Court voted five to four to extend this doctrine of "actual
malice" to public figures.42 Justice Warren wrote what became the
Court's position on this extension. He reasoned,
[M]any who do not hold public office at the moment are nevertheless
intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or,
by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at
large ....
... [A]lthough they are not subject to the restraints of the polit-
ical process, "public figures," like "public officials," often play an influ-
ential role in ordering society. And surely as a class these "public
figures" have as ready access as "public officials" to mass media of
communication, both to influence policy and to counter criticism of
their views and activities. Our citizenry has a legitimate and substan-
tial interest in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press to
engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues
and events is as crucial as it is in the case of "public officials."
'4 3
In 1974, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,' the Court limited the con-
cept of who is a public person,45 holding that "absent clear evidence of
40. Id. at 279-80.
41. Id.
42. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (consolidated with Associated
Press v. Walker).
In Associated Press v. Walker, an Associated Press eyewitness news dispatch from the
University of Mississippi was circulated around the Nation. The University had been ordered
by a federal court to enroll a black student, James Meredith. The A.P. dispatch said that
retired Army Major General Walker took command of a violent crowd and led a riot against
federal marshals trying to enforce the court's order. The Supreme Court ruled against plaintiff
Walker by a vote of nine to zero. Id. at 142.
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, Wallace Butts was the former athletic director for the
University of Georgia. The Saturday Evening Post ran a story saying that while Butts had
been athletic director for the University of Georgia, he had given some of his school's football
secrets to Paul "Bear" Bryant, coach of the University of Alabama. Supposedly Butts had
given Bryant this secret information over the telephone a week before the game, and an insur-
ance salesman, who had been accidentally connected into the telephone line, overheard the
conversation. By a decision of five to four, the Court ruled for plaintiff Butts.
All the Justices agreed that Walker and Butts were "public figures." Justice Harlan
stated, "Butts may have attained that status by position alone and Walker by his purposeful
activity amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the 'vortex' of an important public
controversy." Id. at 155 (Harlan, J., writing for the Court).
43. Id. at 164.
44. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
45. The decision in Gertz also marked a retreat from the Court's high-water mark in
imposing the "actual malice" standard. Three years earlier, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), a plurality of the Court voted to extend the actual malice requirement
to cases involving a "matter of public interest." Thus, the Court was looking at whether the
subject matter of the case was one of public interest instead of asking whether the plaintiff was
a public official or a public figure. Under this approach, the actual malice standard was ap-
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general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement
in the affairs of society, an individual should not be deemed a public
personality for all aspects of his life."46 The Court said that a person
may be designated a public figure on either of two bases:
In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or
notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all
contexts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or
is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a
public figure for a limited range of issues. In either case, such persons
assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions.47
Under Gertz, states are permitted to give greater protection to pri-
vate individuals than to public figures in libel cases.48 Most states use
"negligence" as the standard.49 In justifying greater protection for pri-
plied to private persons caught up in events of public interest, such as Rosenbloom. Id. at 52.
(Rosenbloom sold nudist magazines, but a Philadelphia radio station falsely said he was linked
to "the smut literature racket." Id. at 34-35.) The Court's Rosenbloom approach was short-
lived; a majority of the Justices never approved this position. Three years later, in Gertz, the
Court made clear that it would be looking at the plaintiff, not the subject matter, to determine
whether to apply the New York Times standard.
46. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
47. Id. at 351-52.
48. The Gertz Court stated the following:
Those who, by reason of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor and success
with which they seek the public's attention, are properly classed as public figures and
those who hold governmental office may recover for injury to reputation only on
clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge
of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth .... Plainly many deserving
plaintiffs, including some intentionally subjected to injury, will be unable to sur-
mount the barrier of the New York Times test .... [W]e conclude that the state
interest in compensating injury to the reputation of private individuals requires that a
different rule should obtain with respect to them.
Id. at 342-43.
The bottom line in Gertz is the following:
We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the [s]tates may
define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broad-
caster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual. This approach...
recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest in compensating private indi-
viduals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media
from the rigors of strict liability for defamation.
Id. at 347-48.
The Court also held that states could not permit plaintiffs to recover punitive damages
unless the plaintiffs have proved "knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth." Id.
at 349. With no such showing, plaintiffs' recovery would be limited to "actual injury." Id.
This, of course, protects defendants from excessive awards. As the Court pointed out, punitive
damages are "not compensation" for actual injury but "private fines levied by civil juries to
punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence." Id. at 350.
49. States which only require a showing of negligence include Arizona, Arkansas, Dela-
ware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missis-
sippi, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Likewise, the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands only
require negligence. See Annotation, State Constitutional Protection of Allegedly Defamatory
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vate individuals, the Court made two major points. First, public figures
have greater access to the media to engage in the self-help of correcting
false statements. Lacking this access, private individuals are more vul-
nerable to injury, so the states have a correspondingly greater interest in
their protection.5" Second, and of even greater importance to the Court,
a compelling normative consideration underlies the public figure/private
person distinction: 51 generally, "public figures have thrust themselves to
the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the
resolution of the issues involved .... [T]hey invite attention and com-
ment." 2 While these two factors may not always exist, the media is jus-
tified in assuming that "public figures have voluntarily exposed
themselves to increased risk of injury. '"53
Statements Regarding Private Individual [sic], 33 A.L.R.4TH 226-28 (1984 & Supp. 1989). The
following states also require only a showing of negligence: Alabama, Connecticut, Iowa,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, and New Hampshire. LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER, 50-
STATE SURVEY 1989, at 5, 118-19, 332-33, 413, 472, 494, 582 (1989) [hereinafter 50-STATE
SURVEY].
New York requires a showing of "gross irresponsibility." Annotation, supra, at 223-26
(1984) (citing, e.g., Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d 531, 416 N.E.2d 557, 435
N.Y.S.2d 556 (1980)).
Some states-Alaska, Colorado, Indiana, Michigan, Texas, and Virginia-require that
private plaintiffs, like public figures, show actual malice, at least in some circumstances. See
Annotation, supra, at 221-23 (citing, e.g., Gay v. Williams, 486 F. Supp 12 (D. Alaska 1979);
Diversified Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1982); AAFCO
Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 321
N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976)) & at 26-27 (Supp. 1989) (citing, e.g.,
Bichler v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 745 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir. 1984); Golden Bear Distrib. Sys.,
Inc. v. Chase Revel, Inc., 708 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1983); Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 325
S.E.2d 713, cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032, (1985)). New Jersey also requires that private plain-
tiffs show actual malice in cases involving media defendants. 50-STATE SURVEY, supra, at 596
(citing Sisler v. Gannett, 104 N.J. 256, 270, 516 A.2d 1083, 1090 (1986)).
In some circumstances, Michigan, Texas, and Virginia only require a showing of negli-
gence. See Annotation, supra, at 228, 230-31. Alaska may move to a negligence standard. See
50-STATE SURVEY, supra, at 17 (citing Sisemore v. U.S. News & World Report, 662 F. Supp.
1529 (D. Alaska 1987) (predicting a change in standard); Schneider v. Pay'N Save Corp., 723
P.2d 619, 625 (D. Alaska 1986) (reserving decision on the standard)).
The standard in Missouri is unclear, since the Missouri Approved Jury Instructions only
require a finding of "fault" but do not define that term. See MISSOURI APPROVED JURY IN-
STRUCTION 23.06(1) (West 1980). The term "fault" is also undefined in Louisiana. See 50-
STATE SURVEY, supra, at 389-90.
Idaho, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, and Wyoming have had no cases deciding the standard of fault in defamation cases
involving private plaintiffs and media defendants. See 50-STATE SURVEY, supra, at 277, 511,
546, 554, 569, 688, 768, 795, 949. In California, North Carolina, and Wisconsin, the standard
is unsettled. See id. at 64-65, 655, 933.
50. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
51. Id. at 344-45.
52. Id. at 345.
53. Id. at 344-45. "Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public
figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public
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The issue of who is a public figure was hotly litigated in the late
1970s; In Time, Inc. v. Firestone,54 the Court, in a five to four decision,
narrowed the definition of who is a public figure. Time, in its "Mile-
stones" section, published the following:
DIVORCED. By Russell A. Firestone, Jr., 41, heir to the tire fortune:
Mary Alice Sullivan Firestone, 32, his third wife; a onetime Palm
Beach schoolteacher; on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery; after
six years of marriage, one son; in West Palm Beach, Fla. The 17-
month intermittent trial produced enough testimony of extramarital
adventures on both sides, said the judge, "to make Dr. Freud's hair
curl. 55
Strictly speaking, the court did not make a finding of adultery in granting
a divorce.
The judge noted in his decree that Mr. Firestone filed for divorce on
the grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery. 56 The exact words the
judge used were,
According to certain testimony in behalf of [Mr. Firestone], extramari-
tal escapades of [Mrs. Firestone] were bizarre and of an amatory na-
ture which would have made Dr. Freud's hair curl. Other testimony,
in [Mrs. Firestone's] behalf, would indicate that [Mr. Firestone] was
guilty of bounding from one bedpartner to another with the erotic zest
of a satyr. The court is inclined to discount much of this testimony as
unreliable. Nevertheless, it is the conclusion and finding of the court
that neither party is domesticated....
... [N]either of the parties has shown the least susceptibility to
domestication, and... the marriage should be dissolved.57
Mrs. Firestone sued for libel. The Supreme Court concluded that to
have been accurate, Time should have reported that the ground for the
divorce was "lack of domestication of the parties. '58
Time argued that Mrs. Firestone was a public figure and, therefore,
the "actual malice" standard should apply, but the Supreme Court held
that she was not a public figure, not even for limited purposes.59
figures must be exceedingly rare." Id. at 345.
One example of an "involuntary public figure" is Oliver Sipple, the Vietnam veteran who
saved President Gerald Ford's life in 1975. Sipple deflected Sara Jane Moore's arm as she fired
a .38 revolver at the President in San Francisco. A columnist wrote that the gay community in
San Francisco was proud of Sipple and that Sipple might help to dispel some of the stereotypes
of homosexuals. Sipple sued over the printing of facts about his sexual orientation without
gaining his consent. His suit was dismissed because a California court determined that he had
been thrust into the vortex of an incident of international newsworthiness. Sipple v. Chronicle
Publishing Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1049-50, 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 670 (1984).
54. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
55. Id. at 452 (citing "Milestones" section from TIME, July 8, 1968).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 450-51.
58. Id. at 458-59.
59. Id. at 455.
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Although Mrs. Firestone had held news conferences during the trial, the
Supreme Court said she had not assumed "any role of especial promi-
nence in the affairs of society, other than perhaps Palm Beach society,"'
and had not "thrust herself to the forefront of any particular public con-
troversy." 6' She should not be deemed a public figure merely because
she was drawn into litigation as a defendant in a divorce case.62
In 1979, on the same day, the United States Supreme Court decided
two cases involving public figures. These cases again reflect the Court's
narrow view of who constitutes a public figure. The first case was Hutch-
inson v. Proxmire.63 Senator William Proxmire had given a "Golden
Fleece" award to Ronald Hutchinson, a scientist who did federally
funded research on monkey behavior, such as the response of monkeys to
aggravating stimuli." Proxmire did not think that the more than
$500,000 awarded to Hutchinson to aggravate monkeys was a good ex-
penditure.65 In a news release, Proxmire said that Hutchinson "made a
fortune from his monkeys and in the process made a monkey of the
American taxpayer."66 The Court said that Hutchinson was not a public
figure, not even for the limited purpose of comment on his receipt of
federal research funds.67 The Court emphasized that Hutchinson had
not "thrust himself or his views into public controversy to influence
others, ' 68 nor did he have any "regular and continuing access to the me-
60. Id. at 453.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 453-54. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, said,
Dissolution of a marriage through judicial proceedings is not the sort of "public con.
troversy" referred to in Gertz, even though the marital difficulties of extremely
wealthy individuals may be of interest to some portion of the reading public. Nor did
respondent [Mrs. Firestone] freely choose to publicize issues as to the propriety of
her married life. She was compelled to go to court by the State in order to obtain
legal release from the bonds of matrimony.
Id. at 454. In a footnote, Rehnquist said, "Nor do we think the fact that [Mrs Firestone] may
have held a few press conferences during the divorce proceedings in an attempt to satisfy
inquiring reporters converts her into a 'public figure.'" Id. at n.3.
63. 443 U.S. Ill (1979).
64. Id. at 114-15.
65. Id. at 114-16. The Court noted that the $500,000 figure used by Proxmire in an-
nouncing the "award," was being disputed by both parties to the lawsuit. Id. at 114 n.l.
66. Id. at 116. The Court said Proxmire's news release was not protected by Congres-
sional immunity. Id. at 130. The Court stated that
A speech by Proxmire in the Senate would be wholly immune and would be available
to other [m]embers of Congress and the public in the Congressional Record. But
neither the newsletters nor the press release was "essential to the deliberations of the
Senate" and neither was part of the deliberative process.
Id.
67. Id. at 135.
68. Id.
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dia."69 Furthermore, defendants, by their own conduct, could not trans-
form private individuals into public figures.7"
The second libel case decided on that day was Wolston v. Reader's
Digest. " Wolston had sued Reader's Digest because a book it published
in 1974 listed him among Soviet agents.72 Wolston had been in the pub-
lic eye briefly, sixteen years earlier, when he was convicted for contempt
of court for not showing up for a grand jury investigation into Soviet
espionage. 73 The Court again emphasized that Wolston had not "'vol-
untarily thrust' or 'injected' himself into the forefront of the public con-
troversy surrounding the investigation of Soviet espionage." '74
B. Is Pring a Private Person, Or Does It Matter?
Given this background of Supreme Court cases on public figures,
was Kimberli Pring's participation in the Miss America pageant enough
to say that she had willfully "thrust" herself into the "vortex" of a na-
tional controversy over the propriety of beauty contests and assumed
"special prominence" in the resolution of the controversy? Did she "en-
gage the public's attention in an attempt to influence" the outcome of the
controversy?75 And does it make a difference in her case?
The trial court in the Pring case considered whether Pring was a
public figure as a threshold issue. 76 After considering her activities as a
beauty queen contestant and a baton twirler,77 the judge concluded that
69. Id.
70. Id. at 136. The Court reasoned,
Hutchinson's... published writings reach a relatively small category of professionals
concerned with research in human behavior. To the extent the subject of his pub-
lished writings became a matter of controversy, it was a consequence of the Golden
Fleece Award. Clearly those charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct,
create their own defense by making the claimant a public figure.
Id. at 135.
71. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
72. Id. at 159.
73. Id. at 162-63.
74. Id. at 166.
It would be more accurate to say that [Wolston] was dragged unwillingly into the
controversy. The Government pursued him in its investigation. [Wolston] did fail to
respond to a grand jury subpoena, and this failure, as well as his subsequent citation
for contempt, did attract media attention. But the mere fact that petitioner volunta-
rily chose not to appear before the grand jury, knowing that his action might be
attended by publicity, is not decisive on the question of public-figure status.
Id. at 166-67.
75. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974).
76. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1101, 1102 (D. Wyo. 1981), rev'd,
695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983). The court considered this
issue in deciding against the defendants' motions for summary judgment.
77. Pring won the "Miss Wyoming" contest and appeared in the "Miss America" pageant
in 1978. She also participated in the "Wyoming Miss Universe" contest, the 1975 "Miss
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while her voluntary endeavors to achieve prominence perhaps resulted in
a modest income as a baton-twirling instructor, she certainly had gained
no "pervasive fame." '78 Nor was there any evidence that she had gained
any increased access to the media.7 9 The judge considered it a "matter of
general knowledge" that the United States has a "multitude of beauty
contests" and "countless marching bands" with a baton twirler.80 But
except for winners of major contests like the Miss America Pageant, con-
testants "fade" into private life.8" In determining Pring's status as a pri-
vate figure, the trial judge reasoned,
Ex-beauty queens and ex-twirling champions surely do not assume an
"influential role in ordering society." Nor have they "assumed roles of
especial prominence in the affairs of society," nor do they occupy posi-
tions of "persuasive power and influence." Neither can it be said that
the Plaintiff has drawn herself into any particular public controversy
and thereby became a limited public figure .... To hold her a public
figure would mean that every good twirler and every beauty contestant
is forever and ever a public figure; and therefore subject to defamatory
statements without redress except for actual malice. We cannot be-
lieve that such a result was intended by the Supreme Court.82
U.S.A. Beauty Pageant," the 1977 "Miss Black Velvet" contest, and the "National Sweet Corn
Festival," but did not win. She won first place in the 1977 National Baton Twirling Champi-
onship and was runner-up in the 1977 "Majorette of America" contest. She won the "Miss
Majorette of Wyoming" title four times. Pring was also a twirler for the University of Wyo-
ming for four years. Her picture has appeared on covers of baton twirling publications, and
she claims to have won 500 baton-twirling trophies. Id. at 1103.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1103-04 (citations omitted).
A centerfold beauty, however, was held to be a "public figure" in Vitale v. National Lam-
poon, Inc., 449 F. Supp..442, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1978). This case involved a "Gentleman's Bath-
room Companion," which contained a parody of Playboy magazine. Id. at 443 n.2. Playboy
had run an advertisement featuring a man on a ski slope with a couple of women. The ad
asked, "WHAT SORT OF MAN READS PLAYBOY?" It answered, in part,
He's a man who demands the best that life has to offer. When he takes to the slopes
he prides himself on having the newest and best gear going. And his buying guide is
PLAYBOY. Fact: PLAYBOY is read by 42% of all men who spent $100 or more on ski
equipment last year.
Id. at 447. The parody ad used a picture of a man sitting on a toilet with a Playboy magazine
stretched out on the floor, opened to reveal the "Playmate" centerfold. The stall door was
closed. The parody ad also asked, "WHAT SORT OF MAN READS PL*YB*Y?" It answered, in
part,
A young man in touch with himself and his own imagination.... With confidence in
his ability to handle himself in tense situations, the PL*YB*Y reader wrings every last
drop of satisfaction from his private pursuits. Helping him stand up to that challenge
is his favorite magazine. Fact: PL*YB*Y is read by nearly half of all young men who
... spent at least $12 on fine spurting goods last year alone.
Id. at 448. The district court explained that "To spare ourselves the literary voyage OUT
which would be required to describe the [parody] picture, we have appended a copy to this
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The Tenth Circuit did not directly address the issue of whether
Pring was a "public" or "private" individual, although the court seemed
tacitly to accept the lower court's view that she should be accorded "pri-
vate person" status. Pring argued that the constitutional doctrine that
words "must reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about
the plaintiff" to be defamatory should apply only to public figures.8 3
However, the court said that "there is no such limitation and the disposi-
tion of the several cases considered ... so demonstrates.,1 4 The cases
considered, National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin8" and Green-
belt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler, 8 6 involved private indi-
viduals and language that could not be taken literally. In Letter Carriers,
persons not joining a union were called "scabs," and a scab was described
as "a traitor to his God, his country." 87 In Greenbelt Cooperative, a land-
owner who held property the city wanted to purchase asked that other
land he owned be rezoned; a newspaper characterized this activity as
"blackmail." But both the "traitor" and "blackmail" language could not
be taken literally. 88 Does this mean it does not matter if Pring is a pri-
vate person-that if the story literally cannot be true, private persons are
no better off as plaintiffs than public figures?
opinion so the reader may share the euphoria of this unique aesthetic experience without the
unwelcome intervention of an interpreter." Id. at 443.
The "Playmate" in the centerfold that lay open on the restroom floor in the parody sued.
for libel-unauthorized use of her picture that damaged her reputation. Id. Based on her
voluntarily posing nude for Playboy on several occasions and "obviously" seeking and getting
her photos circulated internationally, the court found her a public figure for the limited pur-
pose of "her role in Playboy." Id. at 445. The court granted a summary judgment for the
defendant, finding that the plaintiff produced no evidence of actual malice. Vitale held that the
parody was making no statement about the plaintiff, but about those who read Playboy; the
plaintiff's picture just happened to be the centerfold at the time National Lampoon produced
its parody. Id. at 446.
83. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695 F.2d. 438, 440 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1132 (1983).
84. Id. at 442.
85. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
86. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
87. Pring, 695 F.2d at 440 (citing National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S.
264, 268 (1974)). The "traitor" language comes from a Jack London article, The Scab, re-
printed in the newsletter of the Letter Carrier's union. The article begins, "After God had
finished the rattlesnake, the toad, and the vampire, He had some awful substance left with
which He made a scab." Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 268.
88. Pring, 695 F.2d at 440. The Tenth Circuit quoted the Supreme Court as follows:
"[W]e hold that the imposition of liability on such a basis was constitutionally impermissible-
that as a matter of constitutional law, the word 'blackmail' in these circumstances was.., not
libel." Id. (quoting Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13 (1970)).
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Gerry Spence, who was Pring's lawyer,8 9 believes that the law
should treat private individuals differently than public figures. "Unlike
Falwell, she [(Pring)] was not a public figure, but instead a sensitive, very
private person," says Spence.90 He described the emotional distress
Pring went through after Penthouse published the story on her supposed
expertise at fellatio:
Now whenever Kim walked down the street, men hollered out of open
car windows, "Hey Penthouse, are you really that good?" She was
plagued with obscene phone calls. She literally had been driven out of
the University of Wyoming by the laughter and, although she was an
above-average, personable student, she was unable to get a job in her
home state. Two kinds interviewed her: those who would not hire her
because of her publicity in Penthouse and those who wanted to exploit
her commercially or sexually because of it. Finally in desperation she
joined the army and became a chaplain's assistant. But even there she
was soon recognized. "Are you as good as they say, Penthouse?" 9 1
89. There is a connection between Pring and the Hustler v. Falwell case, according to
Spence. "Sadly," Spence says, "it was my own losing case against Penthouse that had provided
Hustler with the legal authority for the Falwell 'parody.'" Spence, supra note 4, at 52.
90. Id. Spence argues for greater protection for public figures as well as private persons.
Id. at 53-58. He concludes,
[I]n Falwell v. Flynt we have been given a preview of the America to come under the
Rehnquist Court. It is not a conservative court at all, but one governed by a new
constitutional commercialism that proclaims everything must be for sale--our peace,
our privacy, our good name, even the memory of our mothers.
Id. at 58.
91. Id. at 52. The trial court in Pring did not submit to the jury the question of whether
allegedly libelous portions of the Penthouse article could be "reasonably understood as describ-
ing actual facts about the plaintiff." Instead, the trial court only submitted to the jury the
question of "identity"-whether Kimberli Pring was identified in the article. Pring v. Pent-
house Int'l, 695 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
The Tenth Circuit stated that "in some circumstances" the "reasonably understood"
question should be decided by the jury. But, the Pring majority ruled that "as a matter of law"
the article could not be "reasonably understood" as describing actual facts. Id. at 442-43.
Some commentators, of course, argue for greater protection for satirists.
One commentator argues that "some courts have departed from traditional rules and have
imposed liability when a satirist has 'appropriated' the name or property of the plaintiff in a
manner which is embarrassing or unpleasant; this is so especially when the material is sexually
explicit. These cases have created liability for a previously unrecognized tort which this article
shall call 'satiric appropriation.'" Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trade-
mark, and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U.L. REV. 923, 926 (1985) (footnotes
omitted). Under the heading of "libel," the author uses one example of satiric appropriation,
Salomone v. Macmillan Publishing Co., 97 Misc. 2d 346, 411 N.Y.S.2d 105 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1978), rev'd, 77 A.D.2d 501, 429 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1980), a case in which she represented the
defendants. Dorsen, supra, at 923, 930.
Salomone involved a parody of Eloise, the cartoon book for children published by Mac-
millan. See K. THOMPSON, ELOISE (1955). In the book, Eloise lived at New York's Plaza
Hotel during the 1950s. In the parody, 26-year-old Eloise returns to the hotel and uses lipstick
to scrawl on a mirror this message about the hotel manager: "Mr. Salomone was a child
molester." The satirists had not realized that indeed Alphonse Salomone was the hotel man-
ager in the mid-1950s. Dorsen, supra, at 930. The trial court denied a motion to dismiss the
1991]
Spence said that the jury verdict in the Pring case of over $26 mil-
lion represented the jury's effort "[t]o put a stop to this kind of exploita-
tion of innocent people once and for all."'9 2 When the Tenth Circuit
threw out every last bit of the award, it used this reasoning, according to
Spence: "Since everybody knows that one cannot be levitated by fellatio,
what Penthouse published about Kim Pring was not fact but fantasy, and
since one can be libeled only by fact, Kim was entitled to nothing."9 "
The result? "[Pring] had no right to her name, no right to peace and
privacy, no right to recover for her pain and her humiliation, no right to
live an ordinary life and hold an ordinary job."94 The twenty-five million
readers claimed by Penthouse enjoyed a good laugh at Pring's expense. 9
Spence argues: "The monstrous joke-Kim Pring levitating men by
fellatio, Jerry Falwell in the outhouse making it with his mother-is per-
haps the most insidious form of defamation, because fact, wisdom, even
the lessons of blood seep through the cracks of man's mortal memory,
but the dirty joke is never forgotten." 96
plaintiff's suit, saying that if humor is "at the expense of a sensitive person, the right of free-
dom of expression and the right of privacy and freedom from undue defamation collide." Id.
(quoting Salomone, 97 Misc. 2d at 347, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 107). But the appellate court dis-
missed the case because of the plaintiffs inability to establish harm to his reputation. Id. at
931 (citing Salomone, 77 A.D.2d at 502, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 442). The trial and appellate courts,
however, both failed to address the "real question: whether the work expressed an opinion or
made a factual statement." Dorsen, supra, at 931.
A Note by Leslie Kim Treiger points to hermeneutics, the study of interpretation or
meaning, as a "helpful tool" for courts in satire cases. Note, Protecting Satire Against Libel
Claims: A New Reading of the First Amendment's Opinion Privilege, 98 YALE L.J. 1215, 1217
(1989) [hereinafter Note, Protecting Satire]. She states that,
Jurors... must ask themselves not how they view the text, or how "ordinary read-
ers" would perceive it, but rather how the actual readers of such material ... would
read the text. The relevant audience is one that is literate in the particular type of
writing, and that has certain genre expectations when reading the type of material in
dispute. Only if the plaintiff gives clear and convincing evidence that a substantial
number of the actual readers believed the statement as fact rather than as satiric
opinion, or if the jurors acting as surrogate readers believe the statement as fact,
should liability be permissible.
Id. at 1233-34 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
See also Note, Humor, Defamation and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: The
Potential Predicament for Private Figure Plaintiffs, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 701 (1990) (au-
thored by Catherine L. Amspacher and Randel Steven Springer) (private figure suits against
media defendants).
92. Spence, supra note 4, at 52.
93. Id.; Note, Protecting Satire, supra note 91, at 1233-34.
94. Note, Protecting Satire, supra note 91, at 1234.
95. Id. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Supreme Court said,
"Suffice it to say that actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more
customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of repu-
tation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffer-
ing." Id. at 350.
96. Spence, supra note 4, at 52.
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III
Appropriation
A. The Public Figure Advantage: Commercial Appropriation of Name and
Likeness
Lest recovery for satirized plaintiffs seem impossible, it should be
noted that some plaintiffs, unlike Pring and Falwell, have walked away
with sizeable awards after being the butt of a joke. Some plaintiffs have
prevailed in parody cases involving trademark infringement. 97 Others
97. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987) ("Mutant of
Omaha" caption under an emaciated Indian's head with feather bonnet on T-shirts and muscle
shirts); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.
1979) (Debbie Does Dallas X-rated film, with "Debbie" partly in a look-a-like Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders' outfit); Chemical Corp. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963) ("Where there's life.., there's bugs" campaign for floor wax
laced with insecticide, parodying "Where there's life.., there's Bud" beer campaign); General
Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1036 (D. Mass. 1979) ("Genital Electric"
monogram on underwear); Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("Gucchi Goo" diaper bag).
On the other hand, parody has been a successful defense in some trademark cases. A
spoof on Cliff's Notes that used the words "a satire" five times on its cover could not cause
confusion with the real Cliffs Notes. Cliffs Notes v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing
Group, 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).
Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987), involved a
small New Mexico enterprise, Hogg Wyld, Ltd., which later changed its name to Oink, Inc.
Two women ran the home-based operation that made jeans for larger women. They consid-
ered several names for their jeans, including "Calvin Swine" and "Vidal Sowsoon," but then
settled on the name Lardashe. Jeans manufacturer Jordache filed suit for tradename infringe-
ment under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1141(l)(a) (1988), which prohibits unauthorized use
of a trademark in a manner that "is likely to cause confusion." The Tenth Circuit decided the
name Lardashe was meant to amuse, not to confuse, stating that "[a]n intent to parody is not
an intent to confuse the public." 828 F.2d at 1486. Nor did Lardashe "dilute" or "tarnish"
the trademark under New Mexico law. Id. at 1491.
High Society used a two-page article, L.L. Beam's Back-To-School-Sex-Catalog, in its Oc-
tober 1984 issue. The magazine's contents page called the article "humor" and "parody."
L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, 811 F.2d 26, 27 (1st Cir. 1987). On first amendment
grounds, the Eleventh Circuit rejected L.L. Bean's argument of trademark infringement and
dilution of trademark, stating that the "parody constitutes an editorial or artistic, rather than a
commercial, use of plaintiff's mark." Id. at 32.
A lampooning poster of a smiling, pregnant Girl Scout, captioned "BE PREPARED," with-
stood a trademark infringement suit. Girl Scouts of the U.S.A. v. Personality Posters Mfg.
Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
For scholarly articles on trademark and parody, see Denicola, Trademarks as Speech:
Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols,
1982 Wis. L. REV. 158 (arguing for greater first amendment protection when trademarks are
used to communicate ideas unless "injurious associations" are created); Dorsen, supra note 91
(arguing for greater first amendment protection for satire in trademark infringement cases);
Kravitz, Trademarks, Speech, and the Gay Olympics Case, 69 B.U.L. REV. 131 (1989) (arguing
that applying "tarnishment rationale" to noncommercial speech allows censorship that should
not be tolerated under the first amendment and that Denicola's view too narrowly protects
speech); Note, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV.
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have prevailed in parody cases involving copyright infringement or in-
fringement of both trademark and copyright."a But in trademark and
copyright cases, the jokes generally seem less personal. Still, other plain-
tiffs who have been quite personally lampooned have received awards for
1079 (1986) (authored by Robert J. Shaughnessy) (movement from the "confusion" to the
"dilution" test in trademark infringement cases has created a problem which the "fair use"
principle cannot solve; the first amendment should limit trademark owner's rights in parody
cases).
98. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981) ("Cunnilingus Champion of
Company C" parody of "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Company B"); Dallas Cowboys Cheer-
leaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979) (The Fifth Circuit
found the district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing a preliminary injunction halting
distribution of "The Ex-Dallas Cheerleaders" poster with partial nudity parodying the copy-
righted Dallas Cheerleaders' poster. The court indicated the defendant might have prevailed
had it not prematurely appealed. Id. at 1188); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751
(9th Cir. 1978) (Air Pirates Funnies, two cartoon magazines, with randy Disney characters
populating the counterculture scene); New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group,
693 F. Supp. 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (A Nightmare on My Street music video parody of A
Nightmare on Elm Street); Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Mickey Mouse March" used as background music for sex acts by males
wearing "Mouseketeer" hats in alleged "parody of life" movie, The Life and Times of the
Happy Hooker. The district court found that the repeated playing of the music went beyond
parody to "a complete copy of the copyrighted material." Id. at 1398. The court issued a
preliminary injunction to stop the improper use of the music. Id.).
The plaintiff won its request for a permanent injunction against the singing telegram com-
pany in both trademark and copyright infringement claims in DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited
Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1984) ("Super Stud"-"faster than a
speeding tortoise; more powerful than an armpit; able to leap tall broads in a single bound; it's
a nurd; it's insane; it's Super Stud"-and "Wonder Wench," who donned costumes and deliv-
ered telegrams).
But some parodying defendants have successfully defended copyright infringement cases.
See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986) ("When Sonny Sniffs Glue" parody of
"When Sunny Gets Blue"); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Brdcst. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Saturday Night Live's "I Love Sodom" parody of "I Love New York" ad
campaign).
In copyright cases involving parodies, a primary concern is "fair use" of the original
work. Fair use "is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). A test for fair
use appears in Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aJf'd sub nom. Columbia
Brdcst. Sys. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958). The case involved the television network's
airing of Jack Benny's parody of the movie Gas Light. Id. at 533. The court said, "A bur-
lesque presentation . . . is no defense to an action for infringement of copyright .... [If it is
determined that there was a substantial taking, infringement exists." Id. at 537. As admitted
by the Ninth Circuit, its ruling in the Benny case has proved "controversial." The court later
clarified its "substantiality" test:
In inquiring into the substantiality of the taking, the district court read our
Benny opinion to hold that any substantial copying by a defendant, combined with
the fact that the portion copied constituted a substantial part of the defendant's
work, automatically precluded the fair use defense ....
The language in Benny should be understood as setting a threshold that elimi-
nates from the fair use defense copying that is virtually complete or almost verba-
tim .... Benny should not be read as taking the drastic step of virtually turning the
test for fair use into the test for infringement.
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appropriation of their names or likenesses through the claim of commer-
cial exploitation, a trespass upon the pocketbook of the famous. The
"right of publicity" is another term for appropriation.99 "[A] celebrity's
Walt Disney Prods, 581 F.2d at 756-57. In the Benny case, the copying was virtually com-
plete. Id.
If no "near-verbatim" copying has been done, then courts can apply the test of "whether
the parodist has appropriated a greater amount of the original work than is necessary to 'recall
or conjure up' the object of his satire." Id. at 757. The "conjuring up" test was further devel-
oped in Berlin v. E.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964). The Second Circuit pointed
out that the Benny decision has been "roundly criticized by many commentators." Id. at 544.
The court decided in favor of the defendant, which had produced a parody issue of Mad maga-
zine, whose cover said, "More Trash From Mad-A Sickening Collection of Humor and Satire
From Past Issues." Id. at 542-43. It included "parody lyrics" to be sung to the music of well-
known songs, some written by Irving Berlin. For example, "A Pretty Girl Is Like A Melody"
was parodied as "Louella Schwartz Describes Her Malady." Id. at 543. The court concluded
that
as a general proposition, we believe that parody and satire are deserving of substan-
tial freedom-both as entertainment and as a form of social and literary criticism.
As the readers of Cervantes' Don Quixote and Swift's Gulliver's Travels, or the paro-
dies of a modern master such as Max Beerbohm well know, many a true word is
indeed spoken in jest. At the very least, where, as here, it is clear that the parody has
neither the intent nor the effect of fulfilling the demand for the original, and where
the parodist does not appropriate a greater amount of the original work than is neces-
sary to "recall or conjure up" the object of his satire, a finding of infringement would
be improper.
Id. at 545 (emphasis in original).
Courts have allowed "more extensive" use of works in parodies than in other fictional or
dramatic works, because a parody normally does not fill the demand for the serious work.
New Line Cinema Corp., 693 F. Supp. at 1525 (citing Elsmere Music Co. v. National Brdcst.
Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)). Courts have, of course, found their "gag" limits.
For instance, in the "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Company B" case, the Second Circuit said,
"We are not prepared to hold that a commercial composer can plagiarize a competitor's copy-
righted song, substitute dirty lyrics of his own, perform it for commercial gain, and then escape
liability by calling the end result a parody or satire on the mores of society. Such a holding
would be an open-ended invitation to musical plagiarism." MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d
180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981).
For scholarly articles on copyright and parody, see Dorsen, supra note 91; Goetsch, Par-
ody as Free Speech-The Replacement of the Fair Use Doctrine by First Amendment Protection,
30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 39 (1981), reprinted in 20 PUB. ENT. ADVERT. & ALLIED FIELDS
L.Q. 133 (1981); Light, Parody, Burlesque, and the Economic Rationale for Copyright, 11
CONN. L. REV. 615 (1979); Note, The Parody Defense to Copyright Infringement: Productive
Fair Use After Betamax, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1395 (1984); Note, The First Amendment v. Right
of Publicity in Theatrical Imitations-A Delicate Balance, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 658
(1982) (authored by John G. Greiner).
99. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983).
"Appropriation" or the "right of publicity" is one of the four forms of invasion of privacy
enunciated by William Prosser. Id. (citing Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389
(1960)).
New York courts "blend the concepts" of the "common law propriety right of publicity"
and the statutorily established "right of privacy"-the right to protection from "commercial
exploitation" under § 51 of New York's Civil Rights Law. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp.
723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (citation omitted). "[T]his right of publicity is usually asserted only
1991]
legal right of publicity is invaded whenever his identity is intentionally
appropriated for commercial purposes.""
For instance, in 1980, Johnny Carson recovered for appropriation of
his name.' 0 ' Carson sued because a portable toilet was being marketed
as "Here's Johnny-The World's Foremost Commodian."'' 2 The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals said there was an even clearer appropriation of
Johnny Carson's persona than if his full proper name had been used. 0 a
Sometimes the relief sought by a plaintiff is an injunction-the stop-
ping of a publication or broadcast-rather than a monetary award. In
1978, Mohammed Ali successfully obtained an injunction against
Playgirl magazine." On its cover, Playgirl used an illustration of Ali
sitting naked in the comer of a boxing ring. The doggerel in the text did
not mention Ali by name, but did refer to "The Greatest," which, of
course, was what Ali called himself. Ali claimed that his "right of pub-
licity" had been violated.' A federal district court in New York con-
cluded, "There can be little question that defendants' unauthorized
publication of the portrait of Ali amounted to a wrongful appropriation
of the market value of the plaintiff's likeness."" The injunction against
Playgirl forbade any further distribution of the magazine featuring Ali's
image. 107
if the plaintiff has 'achieved in some degree a celebrated status.'" Id. at 729 (citations omit-
ted).
See also Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("right of
publicity" is "merely a misnomer for the privacy interest protected by the [New York] Civil
Rights Law, as applied to public figures") (citing Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc.,
64 N.Y.2d 174, 472 N.E.2d 580, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1984)).
100. Carson, 698 F.2d at 837.
101. Id. at 836.
102. Id. at 833.
103. Id. at 837.
Besides "name" and "likeness," voice appropriation can also be the subject of a successful
suit. In 1988, "The Divine Miss M," Bette Midler, won the right to sue in a case involving
appropriation of her voice in broadcast ads for cars. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460
(9th Cir. 1988). The imitation Midler was singing "Do You Want to Dance" in a manner so
convincing that even her friends thought Midler was hawking cars. Id. at 461-62. The court
said, "We hold.., that when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is
deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not
theirs." Id. at 463. The case was remanded for trial. Id. Midler won a $400,000 jury award.
Harrington, War Declared On Musical "Groove Robbers," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 2,
1990 at El, col. 3.
104. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
105. Id. at 726.
106. Id. at 729.
107. Id. at 729, 732.
New York, by statute, allows injunctions to be sought by "any person whose name, por-
trait, or picture is used within [New York] for.., the purposes of trade without the written
consent [of that person]." Id. at 726. For more on the Ali case, see infra note 123.
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Comedian Woody Allen obtained an injunction against a clothing
store, Men's Fashion World, that was using a Woody Allen look-alike in
an ad. 108 The caption said, "Men's Fashion World made me a sex sym-
bol."" Even though the ad had a disclaimer which said that the man
pictured was a celebrity look-alike, "0 the court used law concerning mis-
leading advertisements to grant the injunction. The court thought con-
sumers could be deluded into thinking Woody Allen endorsed the
fashions from Men's Fashion World."'
The plaintiff has to prove an appropriation of name, voice or image
in appropriation cases. In addition, some jurisdictions require a showing
that the defendant gained a monetary advantage by the appropriation." 2
But plaintiffs also must be able to show "commercial purpose," and this
requirement spells trouble for some plaintiffs.' ' 3
B. Limits to Appropriation: Strictly Commercial Purpose and Opinions on
Newsworthy Topics
Falwell sued unsuccessfully for appropriation of his name and like-
ness in the Hustler parody ad.'14 Falwell's group, the "Moral Majority,"
opposed pornography, among other things. Hustler used Falwell's image
to express its opinion on a newsworthy topic.
108. Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). See also an
earlier case involving Phil Boroff, the same Woody Allen look-alike, Allen v. National Video,
Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
109. Men's World Outlet, 679 F. Supp. at 361.
110. Id. at 362, 367.
111. Id. at 370.- Allen used the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982), which, at the
time the case was decided, stated, "Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in
connection with any goods or services... a false designation of origin, or any false description
or representation... shall be liable to a civil action.., by any person who believes that he is or
is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation." 679 F.
Supp. at 368 n.15.
112. For instance, N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney Supp. 1990) and CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1990) require that monetary advantage be gained. Oregon
requires either economic exploitation or use of a picture when the picture was "obtained or
broadcast in a manner or for a purpose wrongful beyond the unconsented publication itself."
Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Anderson v. Fisher
Brdcst. Co., 300 Or. 452, 469, 712 P.2d 803, 818 (1986)).
113. Most jurisdictions recognize a cause of action for invasion of privacy through use of a
name or likeness for nonadvertising purposes. New York, however, requires that all appropri-
ation cases be brought under New York statutory law, which requires trade advertising pur-
poses. Annotation, Invasion of Privacy by Use of Plaintifs Name or Likeness for'
Nonadvertising Purposes, 30 A.L.R.3D 209 (1970 & Supp. 1990) (citing Gautier v. Pro-Foot-
ball, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952)); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1990). See generally Annotation, Invasion of Privacy by Use of Plaintifi's Name or
Likeness in Advertising, 23 A.L.R.3D 865 (1969 & Supp. 1990).
114. See supra notes 20-38 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, two women represented by Gerry Spence's law firm also
tried the tactic of suing for "misappropriation of image" in addition to
suing for libel, infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy." I
Peggy Ault founded an Oregon organization to oppose an adult video
store, and Dorchen Leidholdt, a New Yorker, founded Women Against
Pornography. Hustler recognized both women as its "Asshole of the
Month."" '6 Their faces were superimposed over the naked rear end of a
bent-over man. Ault was described as a "frustrated," "tightassed house-
wife" and a "deluded busybody."' 1 7 Leidholdt was called a "pus bloated
walking sphincter" who suffered from both "bizarre paranoia" and sex-
ual repression and belonged to a "frustrated group of sexual fascists."1 18
The Ninth Circuit rejected Ault's claim that her image was misap-
propriated for a commercial purpose. The court wrote, "While Hustler's
objectives may well have commercial undertones, the article, as an ex-
pression of constitutionally protected opinion on a matter of public inter-
est, is 'newsworthy.' "19 The Ninth Circuit likewise denied Leidholdt's
claim of misappropriation. The court ruled that she had failed to state
such a claim under the laws of New York or California "because
Leidholdt's image was not used exclusively for Hustler's commercial
gain." 20 The purpose, as in Ault, was not simply commercial because
Hustler was expressing its opinion on the pornography debate. 2 ' The
court declared that "[t]he fact that Hustler Magazine is operated for
profit does not extend a commercial purpose to every article within
it.,,122
115. Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1988); Leidholdt v. L.F.P.,
Inc., 860 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1988).
116. Leidholdt, 860 F.2d at 892.
117. Ault, 860 F.2d at 879.
118. Leidholdt, 860 F.2d at 892, 894.
119. Ault, 860 F.2d at 883.
120. Leidholdt, 860 F.2d at 895.
121. Id.
122. Id.
In 1989, an attorney in Spence's office filed a suit against Hustler on behalf of a feminist
who helped draft an antipornography ordinance for Indianapolis. Dworkin v. Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1190 (9th Cir. 1989). The ordinance was held unconstitutional. Id.
(citing American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), afl'd mem.,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986)). Dworkin was mentioned in three Hustler features in February, March,
and December 1984. For instance, in the February feature, a cartoon depicted two lesbians
engaging in oral sex. The caption read, "You remind me so much of Andrea Dworkin, Edna.
It's a dog-eat-dog world." Dworkin, 867 F.2d at 1190-91. Dworkin admitted she was a public
figure for purposes of this case. Id. at 1190. The court, citing Ault and Leidholdt, concluded
the features were "privileged opinion." Id. at 1193.
Gerry Spence also sued Larry Flynt and Hustler magazine for libel, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy, among other things. Spence v. Flynt, 647 F.
Supp. 1266, 1268 (D. Wyo. 1986). In its July 1985 issue, Hustler ran an article that com-
mented about Spence serving as Dworkin's attorney. Id at 1269. But the federal district court
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As a general conclusion, if an article expresses an opinion on a news-
worthy topic, whether in a serious or satirical vein, this fact will override
any incidental commercial purposes. 1 23  Courts protect fictional works,
including parodies, which include the names of famous people.124 The
found it had no jurisdiction in the case and remanded it to state court. Id at 1274. No state
case is available, according to the LExis computerized legal research service.
123. Newsworthiness caused Ann-Margret to lose her suit for violation of her right of pri-
vacy and right of publicity against High Society Magazine, which published a "Celebrity Skin"
edition that included a picture of her nude from the waist up. The picture was taken from one
of her movies. Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401, 404 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). The court said,
[T]he fact that the plaintiff, a woman who has occupied the fantasies of many
moviegoers over the years, chose to perform unclad in one of her films is a matter of
great interest to many people. And while such an event may not appear overly im-
portant, the scope of what constitutes a newsworthy event has been afforded a broad
definition and held to include even matters of "entertainment and amusement, con-
cerning interesting phases of human activity in general."
Id at 405 (citations omitted).
Comedian Pat Paulsen also lost his suit for a preliminary injunction against Personality
Posters, Inc., which marketed a poster with his photograph and the caption, "FOR PRESI-
DENT." Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 445, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 503
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968). The court did not resolve the question of whether Paulsen had submit-
ted the photograph to the defendant for unlimited distribution. Id at 445-46, 299 N.Y.S.2d at
504. The court said,
It is apparently plaintiff's position that since "he is only kidding" and his presidential
activities are really only a "publicity stunt" they fall outside the scope of constitu-
tionally protected matters of public interest. Such premise [sic] is wholly untenable.
When a well-known entertainer enters the presidential ring, tongue in cheek or other-
wise, it is clearly newsworthy and of public interest. A poster which portrays plain-
tiff in that role, and reflects the spirit in which he approaches said role, is a form of
public interest presentation to which protection must be extended.
Id. at 449-50, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
In Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the court recognized the
protection of newsworthiness, but said flatly, "there is no such informational or newsworthy
dimension to defendants' unauthorized use of Ali's likeness." Instead, the picture of Ali naked
on the cover of the magazine was merely used for the trade purpose of attracting attention.
For more on the Ali case, see supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text. See generally
Annotation, Invasion of Privacy by Use of Plaintiff's Name or Likeness for Nonadvertising Pur-
poses, 30 A.L.R.3D 203 (1970 & Supp. 1990).
124. A family member brought a misappropriation suit as heir of movie legend Rudolph
Valentino, whose real name was Rudolpho Guglielmi, after the American Broadcasting Corp.
(ABC) aired the film, Legend of Valentino: A Romantic Fiction. Guglielmi v. Spelling-
Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 862, 603 P.2d 454, 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 352 (1979) (Bird,
C.J., concurring). In Guglielmi, the California Supreme Court held that the common-law
right of publicity is not inheritable. Id at 861, 603 P.2d at 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 353. In a
concurring opinion, Chief Justice Bird stated,
[N]o author should be forced into creating mythological worlds or characters wholly
divorced from reality. The right of publicity derived from public prominence does
not confer a shield to ward off caricature, parody and satire. Rather, prominence
invites creative comment. Surely, the range of free expression would be meaningfully
reduced if prominent persons in the present and recent past were forbidden topics for
the imaginations of authors of fiction.
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exclusively commercial use of a person's name or likeness, however, con-
stitutes forbidden appropriation.
Having characterized the satirical statements about Ault and
Leidholdt as opinion, the Ninth Circuit concluded that whether women
were public figures or private persons made no difference.125
IV
Commercial and Personal Interests
A. Is the Law on Satirical Expression of Opinions Fair?
For persons who have actively joined the fray, the doctrine that sa-
tirical expression of an opinion on a newsworthy topic overrides inciden-
tal commercial purposes appears to be a prudent protection of first
amendment rights. Any weakening of first amendment protection in this
area could well jeopardize many expressions of opinion, including edito-
rials and political cartoons. 126 Victorious Hustler publisher Larry Flynt,
in the July 1988 issue of Hustler, wrote an ecstatic editorial entitled,
"Fuck You If You Can't Take a Joke."'127 Speaking of his fight against
erosion of the first amendment and "Falwell's attempt to intimidate and
stifle political and social satire,"' 28 Flynt said:
Letting Falwell get away with his claim could have wiped out any form
of satire, from political cartoons to standup comics' routines that lam-
poon obvious targets of our time.
Id. at 869, 603 P.2d at 460, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 358 (Bird, C.J., concurring). The court then gave
the example of cartoonist Gary Trudeau and his Doonesbury strip, which satiriies famous
people. Id. at n. 12. Although few courts have considered the question, consistently "the right
of publicity has not been held to outweigh the value of free expression." Id. at 872, 603 P.2d
461-62, 160 Cal. Rptr. 359-60. In 1984, however, the California legislature made the right of
publicity inheritable. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1990).
In Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), afid, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.
1989), Ginger Rogers sued MGM/UA over its release of the film Ginger and Fred, created and
produced by Federico Fellini. Rogers lost on her claim that the movie violated the Lanham
Act, § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982), by causing the mistaken impression that the film was
about her or that she in any way endorsed it. Nor did the film violate her common-law right of
publicity or constitute false-light invasion of privacy. 875 F.2d at 997-1005. The film is about
two fictional dancers who imitated Rogers and Astaire in their cabaret act. Id. at 996-97.
125. The Ninth Circuit concluded in the Ault case that "the opinion privilege bars recovery
for intentional infliction of emotional distress whether Ault is a public figure or a private per-
son for first amendment purposes and we do not decide her status." Ault, 860 F.2d at 880.
In an earlier case, the same court had concluded that the opinion privilege applies to
private as well as public persons in defamation cases. Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 553
(1983).
126. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
127. Flynt, Publisher's Statement: Fuck You If You Can't Take a Joke, HUSTLER, July
1988.
128. Id.
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. . . I am very happy to have helped ensure that one of those [legal]
precedents guarantees every American the right to make fun, particu-
larly of those people who try to hold themselves above the rest of the
world. 129
One judge involved in the Falwell case concurred with Flynt:
"Nothing is more thoroughly democratic than to have the high-and-
mighty lampooned and spoofed." 130  Certainly caricatures of Ronald
Reagan's wrinkled neck or Dan Quayle's boyish, sometimes vacant grin
should not result in successful appropriation of image claims. Whoopi
Goldberg should be permitted to act out Reagan's "screwing" segments
of the American population in her literal, licentious fashion without fear
of legal reprisal.
If the only goals are to protect commentary on newsworthy issues
and not further subject publishers to the difficult task of trying to deter-
mine when a person has crossed the line from private individual to public
person, the Pring decision seems sound. But protection of reputation is
also an important goal. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly said, the
right of every individual to protect his or her reputation " 'reflects no
more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every
human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered
liberty.' ,131 Worth, in terms of personal value, is given little considera-
tion in Pring.
Worth, in terms of commercial value, however, is given considera-
tion by the courts. Traditionally, courts have given less protection to
commercial speech than to political speech.132 But, courts have given
even less protection to people than to commercial speech. In its infancy,
the FTC could only protect commercial interests, not people, from de-
ceptive advertising. The United States Supreme Court pointed out this
absurdity in a 1931 case, Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam. 133 The
129. Id.
130. Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484, 487 (4th Cir. 1986) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting from en
banc denial of rehearing).
131. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 311 (1974) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966)). See quoted passage infra 175.
132. In Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), the Supreme Court unanimously de-
nied first amendment protection to purely commercial advertising. But in Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the Supreme
Court extended commercial protection to purely commercial advertisement. For cases on reg-
ulation of commercial speech, see, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), and Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S.
328 (1986).
133. 283 U.S. 643 (1931). Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat
717, 719-21 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988)), stated that "unfair methods
of competition in commerce are hereby declared- unlawful." The Act supplements the Sher-
man Antitrust Act and the Clayton Act. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam, 283 U.S. 644,
647 (1931) (citation omitted).
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Raladam Company made "Marmola," a so-called "obesity cure" that
contained "desiccated thyroid." Although Raladam claimed its concoc-
tion was "safe and effective," the FTC disagreed and ordered the com-
pany to stop its deceptive advertising. 134 But the Supreme Court said
that the Act which established the FTC did not forbid deceptive advertis-
ing unless it also injured competing businesses. 135 In short, it was all
right to hurt consumers, but not a competitor's business interests.
Over the next few years, consumers died unnecessarily from a vari-
ety of products, including nearly 100 people who died in 1937 from tak-
ing an untested drug known as "elixir sulfanilamide."' 136  In 1938,
Congress established the Food and Drug Administration to regulate false
labeling of foods, drugs, and cosmetics 37 and gave the FTC power to
protect consumers from false advertising.
31
In its protection of the right to satire or parody, the court system
seems to be taking a position similar to that in the 1931 Raladam case-
protecting commercial interests from harm, but not people. This analogy
applies, for, just as in Raladam, where commercial interests were given
more protection than personal interests (health and life), currently, com-
mercial interests in names and likenesses are given more protection than
personal interests (reputation and peace of mind). In short, courts are
much more likely to grant a plaintiff recovery in satire cases concerned
with commercial exploitation of the name or likeness of the individual
than in satire cases involving the plaintiff's reputation or mental
suffering.
Allowing no recovery for Pring, the target of a salacious joke, does
not square well with allowing Johnny Carson to recover for "Here's
Johnny-The World's Foremost Commodian."'' 39 The puckish use of
Carson's identity by a portable toilet manufacturer pales beside the vul-
gar use of Pring's identity in Hustler. Nor does Pring's case fit well with
"opinion" cases such as Falwell, Letter Carriers, or Leidholdt. The
Falwell parody is truly unbelievable;" no one would literally consider
134. Id at 645-46.
135. Id at 649.
136. United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 n.17 (1968); United States v.
Kaybel, Inc., 430 F.2d 1346, 1347 (3d Cir. 1970).
137. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1988, §§ 201-706, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified at
21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393) (1988)).
138. "Unfair methods or competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988).
139. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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nonstriking letter carriers to be "traitors";141 Leidholdt is not literally a
"pus bloated walking sphincter." '142
But the statements made about Pring had such a sufficient ring of
truth that her whole life was interrupted. While it would be impossible
for Pring to cause levitation, certainly it would be possible for her to be
an expert at fellatio. 143 Phrases such as "walking on Cloud Nine" or
"walking on thin air" are familiar hyperboles; levitating is similar. While
Pring's "act" would not be televised, certainly she could be indiscrimi-
nate about the time and place of her performance and liberal in acceding
to requests. Her sexual mores could be "any time, any place, any one,"
as the Penthouse story suggested." In short, the Pring story looks as if
it presents facts that have just been stretched in an attempt to achieve a
humorous effect 145-facts that Pring has great expertise in fellatio and
will perform fellatio indiscriminately.
B. "False Facts": An Oxymoron and a Hazard
Unlike opinions, "false facts" receive no constitutional protection.
According to the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.:
Under the [f]irst [a]mendment there is no such thing as a false idea.
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction
not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of
141. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
143. Dissenting in Pring, Judge Breitenstein said:
The article contains both fact and fiction. The article says that Miss Wyoming per-
formed fellatio with a male companion and caused him to levitate. In her appearance
at a national Miss America contest she thought that she might save the world by
similar conduct with high officials. She manipulated her baton so as to simulate
fellatio. She performed fellatio with her coach in view of television cameras. I con-
sider levitation, dreams, and public performance as fiction. Fellatio is not.
Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695 F.2d 438, 443 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983)
(Breitenstein, J., dissenting).
144. Historically, saying that a woman was promiscuous was one of four categories for
slander per se, meaning that damages to reputation were presumed. See, e.g., Hollman v.
Brady, 233 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 574 (1977). Pre-
sumed damages were ruled unconstitutional "at least when liability is not based on a showing
of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
145. A related problem is this: What if a statement of opinion implies that undisclosed
defamatory facts are the basis of an opinion? Such statements can be held defamatory. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977); Braig v. Field Communications, 310 Pa.
Super. 569, 581, 456 A.2d 1366, 1373 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 970 (1984) (adopting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566). But fulfilling the Restatement requirements may
be difficult. See Cole v. Westinghouse Brdcst. Co., 386 Mass. 303, 313, 435 N.E.2d 1021, 1027
(1982) (denying recovery because it was not clear any undisclosed defamatory facts were im-
plied). For an analysis of the Restatement concerning opinion, see Hill, Defamation and Pri-
vacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 123945 (1976).
1991]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 13:141
other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of
fact. 146
Some lower courts interpreted this passage to mean that while "false
facts" are not protected, there is constitutional protection for all opin-
ions. 14  But in 1990, in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 141 the Supreme
Court said, "[W]e do not think this passage from Gertz was intended to
create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be la-
beled 'opinion.' "149 The Court used the example, "In my opinion Jones
is a liar."' 0 These words, the Court said, can damage a reputation as
much as the words, "Jones is a liar."'' It is the "defamatory facts im-
plied by a statement" that give rise to a defamation action.' 52
146. 418 U.S. at 339.
147. For instance, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia said that "Gertz was
... the first decision by the Court to suggest an absolute, constitutionally based protection for
opinions." Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Opinions are protected
regardless of whether they are expressed about private or public persons. "In a word, Gertz's
reasoning immunizes an opinion, not because the opinion is asserted about a public figure, but
because there is no such thing as a 'false' opinion." Id. at 976.
148. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
149. Id. at 2705. Instead, the Court explained, the word "opinion" should be equated with
the preceding word "idea," thus making the passage "merely a reiteration of Justice Holmes'
classic 'marketplace of ideas' concept." Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2705-06. The Court cites Judge Friendly's opinion in Cianci v. New York
Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980): "[It] would be destructive of the law of
libel if a writer could escape liability for accusations of [defamatory conduct] simply by using,
explicitly or implicitly, the words 'I think.'" Id. at 2706. For more on the Cianci case, see
infra note 176 and accompanying text.
152. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706 n.7 (emphasis added). In Milkovich, the implied, defam-
atory facts appeared in a column written by Theodore Diadiun and published in an Ohio
newspaper. The column implied that Michael Milkovich lied on the stand in a judicial pro-
ceeding. Id. at 2697-98.
Milkovich had been a high school wrestling coach in Maple Heights, Ohio, when a fight
broke out between his team and a visiting team, injuring several people. At a hearing by the
Ohio High School Athletic Association (OHSAA), both Milkovich and his school's superin-
tendent, Don Scott, testified. OHSAA placed the Maple Heights team on probation and cen-
sured Milkovich for his conduct during the fight. Milkovich and Scott testified again in a suit
against OHSAA filed by several parents and wrestlers who sought a restraining order on the
grounds they were denied due process. OHSAA lost. Id. at 2698.
Diadiun's column bore the headline, "Maple Beat the Law with the 'Big Lie.'" The
column said, in part,
"[A] lesson was learned (or relearned) yesterday by the student body of Maple
Heights High School, and by anyone who attended the Maple-Mentor wrestling meet
of last Feb. 8.
"It is simply this: If you get in a jam, lie your way out.
"The teachers responsible were mainly Maple wrestling coach, Mike Milkovich,
and former superintendent of schools, H. Donald Scott.
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The Court's apparent question in Gertz and Milkovich is what con-
stitutes a factual statement. The Court in Milkovich, however, declined
the opportunity to present a list of factors for determining whether a
statement presents a fact or an opinion. In fact, the Court said, "[W]e
think the 'breathing space' which 'freedoms of expression require in or-
der to survive,' . . . is adequately secured by existing constitutional doc-
trine without the creation of an artificial dichotomy between 'opinion'
and fact."' 15
3
In reviewing the case law that comprises this protective constitu-
tional doctrine, the Court cited as first and foremost Philadelphia News-
papers, Inc. v. Hepps. 154 Under Hepps, at least in cases involving media
defendants, statements about matters of public concern must be "prova-
ble as false" to result in defamation liability.15 5 Next, the Court noted
the protection established in the Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Associ-
ation, Inc. v. Bresler, Letter Carriers v. Austin, and Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell line of cases: statements which cannot "reasonably [be]
interpreted as stating actual facts" cannot defame an individual. This
standard protects "imaginative expression" and "rhetorical hyper-
bole."' 56 The Court also listed as protection the "culpability" require-
ments of New York Times and Gertz. I 7 Finally, the Court pointed to the
"Anyone who attended the meet, whether he be from Maple Heights, Mentor,
or impartial observer, knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing
after each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth."
Id. (quoting Milkovich v. The News-Herald, 46 Ohio App. 3d 20, 21, 545 N.E.2d 1320, 1321-
22 (1989).
Milkovich sued for defamation, claiming the column accused him of committing perjury.
Id. at 2699. After a tortuous history, Milkovich lost on the grounds that the article was "con-
stitutionally protected opinion." Id. at 2698, 2700-01. See infra note 164 for the Ohio
Supreme Court's reasoning based on the same factual situation.
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Milkovich case, concluding:
This is not the sort of loose, figurative or hyperbolic language which would negate
the impression that the writer was seriously maintaining petitioner committed the
crime of perjury. Nor does the general tenor of the article negate this impression.
We also think the connotation that petitioner committed perjury is sufficiently
factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false.
110 S. Ct. at 2707. See also id. at 2708-15 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
153. Id. at 2706 (citation omitted).
154. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
155. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
156. Id. For a discussion of Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association and National As-
sociation of Letter Carriers, see supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
Falwell, see supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
157. Milkovich, .110 S. Ct. at 2706-07. On New York Times and Gertz, see supra notes 39-
48 and accompanying text.
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"enhanced appellate review" of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union."15 The
Court concluded, "We are not persuaded that, in addition to these pro-
tections, an additional separate constitutional privilege for 'opinion' is
required to ensure the freedom of expression guaranteed by the [flirst
[almendment." 1 9
Although the Court did not formulate a list of factors for determin-
ing if a statement is an opinion or fact, the Court did employ the distinc-
tion between opinion and fact. In Milkovich, it stated that the
"connotation that the petitioner perjured himself is sufficiently factual to
be susceptible of being proved true or false. ' ' 1" In short, the Court em-
ployed the opinion-fact distinction which it calls "artificial," and thus the
distinction remains viable.
Because the Supreme Court provided little guidance in Gertz, lower
courts formulated lists of factors for determining whether a statement
presents a fact or an opinion. 61 The Ninth Circuit applies a three-part
test for determining if speech constitutes protected opinion:
(1) whether the words can be understood in a defamatory sense in
light of the facts surrounding the publication, including the medium by
which and the audience to which the statement is disseminated; (2)
whether the context in which the statements were made, e.g., public
debate or a labor dispute, would lead the audience to anticipate persua-
sive speech such as "epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole"; and (3)
whether the language used is the kind generated in a "spirited legal
dispute." 162
158. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707 (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485,
499 (1984)). Bose requires "'that in cases raising [lirst [a]mendment issues... an appellate
court has an obligation to 'make an independent examination of the whole record' in order to
make sure that 'the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free
expression.'" Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705 (quoting Bose, 466 U.S. at 499, which quoted N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964))).
The Milkovich case presents an interesting, succinct history of defamation law. Id at
2702-05, in which it quotes Shakespeare as follows:
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord.
Is the immediate jewel of their souls.
Who steals my purse steals trash;
'Tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'this his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.
Id at 2702 (quoting W. SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, Act III, scene 3).
159. Id. at 2707.
160. Id.
161. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1984). For an in-depth discussion, see
Gleason, The Fact/Opinion Distinction in Libel, 10 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 763 (1988).
162. Leidholdt v. L.F.P., Inc., 860 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Information
Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 783-84 (9th Cir. 1980)). The
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The "crux," according to the Ninth Circuit, "is whether a reasonable
listener or reader should know the speaker did not intend to be taken
literally."' 63
In Ollman, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
presented an alternative to the Ninth Circuit test. 164 Its four-part test
considers (1) the definiteness of a statement; (2) the verifiability of a
statement; (3) its linguistic context; and (4) its social context. 165 Looking
at the "common usage" of the language, the court first determines if it
has a "precise core of meaning" (fact) or whether it is "indefinite and
ambiguous" (opinion). 166 Second, the court considers whether a state-
ment can be "objectively characterized as true or false" (fact).167 This
should aid the court in deciding if a statement deserves the "absolute
privilege conferred upon expressions of opinion."' 61 Moving from lan-
guage to context, the court next considers the entire article from which
the statement came16 9 and, finally, the "broader context or setting in
which the statement appears."' 170 In considering this broader context,
the court cited the finding in Pring that "the imputation that the plaintiff
court quotes the same test in Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877, 881 (9th Cir.
1988).
163. Leidholdt, 860 F.2d at 894.
164. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 979-85.
165. Id. at 985. In the case that arose out of the same factual situation as Milkovich,
namely Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 250, 496 N.E.2d 699, 706 (1986), the Ohio
Supreme Court used the four Oilman factors to find that the language in Diadiun's column
was opinion. The Ohio Supreme Court decided that while the first two factors ("specific lan-
guage" and "whether the statement is verifiable") leaned toward "fact," id. at 251-52, 496
N.E.2d at 707, they were outweighed by the third and fourth factors. Id. at 254, 496 N.E.2d at
709. Under the third, the "general context," the Ohio Supreme Court said "the large caption
'TD Says' . . . would indicate to even the most gullible reader that the article was, in fact,
opinion." Id. at 252, 496 N.E.2d at 707. Under the fourth, the "broader context," the Ohio
Supreme Court called the sports page, where the column appeared, "a traditional haven for
cajoling, invective, and hyperbole." Id. at 253, 496 N.E.2d at 708. Thus, the Ohio Supreme
Court concluded, the column "would probably be construed as the writer's opinion." Id. at
254, 496 N.E.2d at 708. For a brief discussion of the factual situation that gave rise to the
Milkovich and Scott cases, see supra note 151.
The Ohio Supreme Court found the language in question to be assertions of fact in an
appeal by Milkovich. Then the court heard the appeal in the Scott case and reversed itself,
finding the language to be opinion. Then in a subsequent appeal in the Milkovich case, which
bounced up and down from trial courts to appellate courts three times, the Ohio Court of
Appeals considered itself bound to follow the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling in Scott that the
language was opinion. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2698, 2700-01.
166. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 979, 982.
169. Id. at 979. Using the linguistic context, the United States Supreme Court was able to
determine that the use of the term "blackmail" to describe a land developer's negotiations with
the city was merely an expression of opinion. Id. at 982 (citing Greenbelt Coop, Publishing
Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970)). See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
170. Id.
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had committed sexual acts on stage at the Miss America Pageant could
not support a libel action when the writing in which the statement ap-
peared was clearly a 'fantasy.' "171
C. The Requirement of Literal Truth: An Invitation to Stretch Facts?
If a statement cannot be literally true, regardless of the test a court
applies, should that alone be enough to give it constitutional protection?
It is here that the court's opinion in the Pring case runs into difficulty.
The Tenth Circuit found in Pring that the "story could not be taken
literally."' 72 But the court then made a leap by adding, "it is simply
impossible to believe that a reader would not have understood that the
charged portions were pure fantasy and nothing else."'"" In fact, readers
who asked Pring such questions as "Are you really that good?" obviously
did not consider the story "pure fantasy and nothing else." Instead,
some readers apparently wondered if the story was merely a stretching of
the truth-an addition of hyperbole to fact. 1 4
A reductio ad absurdum on Pring-carrying the case's logic to its
extreme-shows the weakness of the decision. Under Pring's logic, to
avoid damages for libel, a publisher or broadcaster would merely have to
stretch false statements of fact until the facts obviously could not be liter-
ally true. All the innuendo of a salacious story would be protected
speech.
Sometimes even public figures or public officials may need protec-
tion. Does the publisher or broadcaster think an official is accepting
bribes? There is no need to check out the facts. Just slant the story so
that the amount cannot be literally true. Is the principal of the school
perhaps having affairs with high school girls? No need to check out the
facts before committing character assassination-just make the numbers
or the situation too preposterous to be literally true. If the official is no
171. Id. at 984. The court also cited National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418
U.S. 264, 286 (1974), saying, "The Supreme Court has expressly recognized the importance of
social context when, in finding as an expression of opinion the use of the word 'traitor' as
applied to an employee who crossed a picket line, the court stated that 'such exaggerated
rhetoric was commonplace in labor disputes.'" Ollman, 750 F.2d at 983. See supra notes 83-
84, 87 and accompanying text.
172. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695 F.2d 438, 439 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1132 (1983).
173. Id. at 443. Compare Greenbelt Coop., 398 U.S. 6 (1970), where the Supreme Court
said, "It is simply impossible to believe that a reader who reached the word 'blackmail' ...
would not have understood exactly what was meant .... Anyone would know that the real
estate broker's tactics were legal and not "blackmail" in the sense of being a crime. The term
"blackmail," the Court said, was "rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet." Id. at 14. The
newspaper simply meant that the real estate developer's "negotiation position was extremely
unreasonable." Id. at 14.
174. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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longer electable or the principal can no longer maintain his position of
trust in the community, that is just a price which must be paid for first
amendment protection for political cartoons, opinions, and the like. The
absurdity of this conclusion illustrates the flaw in Pring.
Certainly some protection for individuals is needed. Courts need to
protect people, not just commercial interests, from misuse of their names
or images, from libel with a salacious smile. Humor is often funny be-
cause it caricatures the truth, stretching it into absurd and funny shapes.
But what if the parody creates the illusion that its humor is based on
truth-truth merely stretched out of proportion? Then recovery for libel
may be necessary in order to meet defamation's purpose of protecting an
individual's interest in maintaining his or her reputation. 75
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which penned
the four-part test for distinguishing fact from opinion, recognized that
"[a] classic example of a statement with a well-defined meaning is an
accusation of a crime .... Post-Gertz courts have therefore not hesitated
to hold that accusations of criminal conduct are statements 'laden with
factual content' that may support an action for defamation."'' 76 As an
example, the court pointed to Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., which
held that an article did not constitute protected opinion when it implied
that the Mayor of Providence, Rhode Island, raped a woman and then
paid her so she would not bring charges. The Second Circuit in Cianci
stated,
The charges of rape and obstruction of justice were not employed in a
"loose, figurative sense" or as "rhetoical hyperbole." A jury could
find that the effect of the article was not simply to convey the idea that
175. According to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of indi-
viduals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood. We would not
lightly require the State to abandon this purpose, for, as Mr. Justice Stewart has
reminded us, the individual's right to the protection of his own good name "reflects
no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty."
418 U.S. 323, 341 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966).
Some protection already exists for defendants under Gertz in that, at least in cases where
actual malice is not proved, actual damages cannot be presumed. Actual damages must be
proved. Under common law, damages for libel were presumed. But the Supreme Court says,
"the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries to punish unpopular opinion rather than to
compensate individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a false fact." Id. at 349.
Having to prove actual damages would prevent recovery for minor infractions by jokesters.
176. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting Cianci v. New Times
Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 63 (2d Cir. 1980)). See generally Annotation, Imputation of
Criminal, Abnormal, or Otherwise Offensive Sexual Attitude or Behavior as Defamation-Post-
New York Times Cases, 57 A.L.R.4TH 404 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977) states that liability for defamatory
opinion only exists if the opinion implies that it is based on "undisclosed defamatory facts."
See supra note 144.
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Cianci was a bad man unworthy of the confidence of the voters of
Providence but rather to produce a specific image of depraved conduct
committing rape with the aid of trickery, drugs and threats of death or
serious injury, and the scuttling of a well-founded criminal charge by
buying off the victim.... To call such charges merely an expression of
"opinion"7 would be to indulge in Humpty-Dumpty's use of
language. 177
The act of fellatio has been condemned by criminal statutes outlaw-
ing sodomy. While modernizing criminal codes has led to the abolition
of sodomy statutes in some states, the taint remains, especially when
combined with promiscuity. 178 As with Humpty-Dumpty, "all the king's
horses and all the king's men" couldn't put Pring's reputation together
again after the imputations in Penthouse.
The Supreme Court has recognized that "it is... often true that one
man's vulgarity is another's lyric."' 179 But if the vulgarity casts serious
doubts on another's morality, the lyric should be ruled out of sync with
first amendment protection.
V
Conclusion
Debate must be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."' 8 ° Politi-
cians must have thick skins; so must anyone who jumps to the forefront
in any newsworthy fray. Our rambunctious, disputatious society will not
tolerate molly coddling. Nor should society stifle creativity in the arts or
tell political cartoonists to put away their caustic pens and produce
pablum. On the other hand, society need not tolerate laissez faire mud
slinging.
Courts rightfully do not want a chilling effect on the press or free-
lance writers. Courts must maintain "breathing space" for first amend-
ment freedoms. 8 However, courts should be wary of a chilling effect on
lifestyles in general. Running for governor or mayor or school board
member, entering a beauty pageant with or without scholarships, playing
177. Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980). But if the ,iter
had made the charges so outrageous that they could not be literally true, perhaps the Cianci
case would have been decided in the plaintiff's favor.
See also Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 381-82, 366 N.E.2d
1299, 1307, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 951 (1977) (statement that a judge was "probably corrupt" did
not use words in a merely "loose, figurative sense").
178. Historically, accusations of "serious sexual misconduct," especially by women, have
been held defamatory. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 574 comments b, c
(1977).
179. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (Harlan, J., writing for the Court).
180. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
181. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988); New York Times
Co., 376 U.S. at 271-72, 279.
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football, twirling a baton-some of these activities are more frivolous
than others, but they are still an essential part of freedom. Especially
needed is "breathing space" for private persons: in the headier heights of
public life, "breathing space" is necessarily a little tighter.
The doctrine that if satire cannot be literally true, it cannot be ac-
tionable, goes too far. Writers merely have to stretch any seemingly fac-
tual content beyond the bounds of literal credibility, leaving behind the
taint-and the nagging questions in people's minds: "Hey, Penthouse,
are you really that good?"' 82
182. Spence, supra note 4, at 52.
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